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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In his first State of the Union Address, President Obama pledged, 
“This year, I will work with Congress and our military to finally repeal 
the law that denies gay Americans the right to serve the country they 
love because of who they are.  It’s the right thing to do.”1  Since its foun-
dation, our country has struggled with the legal and social challenge of 
defining the “right thing” with respect to a perceived tension between a 
desire for military effectiveness on the one hand, and concerns over the 
inequality arising from blanket rules classifying certain citizens as inelig-
ible for the privilege of citizenship that is military service because of 
“who they are” on the other. 
Through World War II, the U.S. military built up during wars and 
narrowed at their close, returning many “citizen soldiers” to civilian life.  
From the earliest days of our military, the post-war narrowing of forces 
restricted military service opportunities on the basis of race, sex, and 
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other classifications.2  In 1792, at the end of the Revolution, Congress 
restricted militia service to “free able-bodied white male citizens.”3  Even 
after World War II, some military leaders resisted racial integration, cit-
ing concerns similar to those advanced today about the integration of gay 
service members; for example, General George Marshall, the Army 
Chief of Staff during the early 1940s, stated, “[E]xperiments within the 
Army in the solution of social problems are fraught with danger to effi-
ciency, discipline, and morale.”4 
Military sociologists document a shift between World War II and 
the present day, where the buildup of citizen soldiers during wartime is 
now replaced with a standing force (of variable size) of professionals 
serving their country.5  Perhaps in part as a result of this transition and in 
part as a result of the evolution of social attitudes, society⎯and the mili-
tary with it⎯began to find earlier exclusions unacceptable.  In 1948, 
President Truman ordered the military to allow African-American men to 
serve on equal terms.6  Years of de facto segregation and discrimination 
followed, but some argue the military ultimately achieved the integration 
of African-Americans more successfully than civil society, or indeed 
drove desegregation in nonmilitary areas.7 
President Obama now calls to repeal another exclusion, the law 
prohibiting service by those who are openly gay, termed “Don’t Ask 
Don’t Tell” (DADT).8  Proponents explained DADT as a compromise 
between full repeal and full enforcement of the ban on gays in the mili-
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tary.9  By changing the regulation into a statute, however, DADT re-
moved the ability of the military and Department of Defense to set evolv-
ing policy on this issue.10  By all accounts, thousands of service mem-
bers, disproportionally women, were still discharged for homosexuali-
ty.11 
The segregation of African-Americans and exclusion of gay Ameri-
cans have appropriately come under fire, but another rule has remained 
oddly under the radar: the exclusion of women from combat.  About the 
same time DADT became law, Congress and the military debated com-
bat-exclusion rules for women.12  The history of these rules combines 
elements of the history of racial segregation and of the ban on gays in the 
military, as well as unique features.  Women served in varying numbers 
and capacities in all of the U.S. wars.13  In World War II, a significant 
number of women served in segregated auxiliary corps.14  At the close of 
World War II, Congress passed a law that abolished the separate aux-
iliary corps and integrated women into the regular force, but imposed 
new, draconian restrictions on women’s service.15  Women were ex-
cluded from combat in aircraft and naval vessels; other provisions re-
stricted promoting women and placed a 2% cap on female personnel.16  
Meanwhile, the Army excluded women from combat roles by internal 
regulation, which was later justified on the basis of the statute.17 
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 13. See infra text accompanying notes 14–28. 
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CORPS DURING WORLD WAR II 14−16 (1996). 
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comm. of the H. Comm. on Armed Services, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1990) (statement of Lieute-
nant General A.K. Ono, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, U.S. Army). 
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Some of the restrictions were lifted in the late 1960s and early 
1970s,18 but a few years later, Congress passed a law reinstating registra-
tion for the draft for men only.19  In 1981, in Rostker v. Goldberg, the 
Supreme Court upheld the male-only draft against an Equal Protection 
challenge that argued the draft discriminated against men.20  The Court 
relied on the combat-exclusion laws to hold that women were not “simi-
larly situated” to men with respect to military service.21  Neither the 
Court nor the plaintiffs questioned the legality of the combat-exclusion 
laws themselves.22 
Recent years have seen further integration of women into the mili-
tary, but the military retains a core set of de jure restrictions on women’s 
service.  During the waning years of the first Bush Administration,23 a 
Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed 
Forces studied opening combat positions to women and recommended 
certain restrictions be lifted, including the ban on women in combat 
ships.24  Under President Clinton, Congress went further and repealed 
statutes prohibiting women’s service on combat ships and aircraft.25 
The next year, the Clinton Administration’s Secretary of Defense, 
Les Aspin, promulgated new rules.  Under these newest rules, restric-
tions prevent women from serving in about 20% of military jobs.26  First, 
women cannot serve in “units below the brigade level whose primary 
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 26. See Schwartz v. Brodsky, 265 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 2003) (dismissing complaint in 
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women since Rostker); OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF. FOR PERS. AND READINESS, 
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mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground.”27  Second, services 
may exclude women in other circumstances, including “where job related 
physical requirements would necessarily exclude the vast majority of 
women service members.”28 
While women are serving in greater numbers and in more military 
positions than ever before, the combat exclusions continue to confer on 
women a different legal status than men.  Recent decisions still cite the 
continued de jure combat exclusion as the basis for continuing to uphold 
the male-only draft registration.29  Further, like the DADT compromise, 
the new opportunities for women were tempered with new statutory limi-
tations: Congress passed a series of laws beginning in 1993, which re-
quired the Secretary of Defense to provide notice to Congress if any of 
these restrictions changed.30 
It was in this landscape that I, then an undergraduate, joined the 
Navy to become a Surface Warfare Officer.  The Navy assigned me to be 
one of the first women on the newly integrated combatant ships in the 
mid-1990s.  Since then, the military landscape has changed dramatically: 
We are fighting two wars.  Furthermore, women are a higher percentage 
of the Armed Services than ever.31 
In today’s military, despite the continued de jure restrictions, the 
armed forces have included increasing percentages of women in the ser-
vices,32 each branch choosing its own strategy for doing so.33  The Army 
has quietly found ways around the restrictions that avoid triggering the 
congressional-reporting requirement.34  A 2004 draft Army presentation, 
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Shape of the All-Volunteer Force, in IRAQ AND THE LESSONS OF VIETNAM 150, 155 (Lloyd C. Gard-
ner & Marilyn B. Young eds., 2007). 
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apparently leaked to the conservative policy advocacy Center for Mili-
tary Readiness, noted that the “pool of male recruits” was “too small to 
sustain” the force as currently configured and explored options to expand 
the use of women in combat positions. 35  Some of those options would 
require congressional notification and some would not; no notification 
has been forthcoming, but many reports indicate women’s increased 
roles.36  With this lack of legal recognition, women experience real con-
sequences; for example, women veterans report that society and even the 
Department of Veterans Affairs often assume women cannot have issues 
associated with combat service, such as post-traumatic stress disorder.37 
Going a different route, the Navy provided formal notice to Con-
gress on February 19, 2010, that women would serve in submarines.38  
After Congress considered the notice, the Navy announced it would be-
gin phasing in billets for female officers (but not enlisted women) on 
submarines: “There are capable women who have the interest, talent, and 
desire to succeed in the submarine force.  Maintaining the best submarine 
force in the world requires us to recruit from the largest possible talent 
pool.”39 
Under the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, the government 
must justify classifications, like the combat-exclusion policy, that limit 
its citizens’ privileges based on “who they are.”  The first Part of this 
Article examines applicable law in the United States as well as chal-
lenges to combat-exclusion laws overseas, concluding that it is well-
established that beliefs about women’s proper role in society are inade-
quate justifications for de jure classifications.  In Part II, the Article turns 
to the main justification for excluding women that differs from the justi-
fications advanced for excluding African-American or gay men: physical 
strength.  Drawing on studies of vocational testing, athletics, and military 
fitness, and using the conservative commentators who have made the 
physical-strength argument most explicitly as a counterfoil, this Article 
examines four problems with the physical-strength rationale: stereotyp-
ing, differential training, trait selection, and task definition.  Each of 
these problems exposes a basis in ideology: The real issue is not that 
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women cannot do the job.  The real issue is that critics believe the mili-
tary should be masculine.  This belief is not, of course, adequate justifi-
cation for a government rule that, on its face, does not treat male and fe-
male citizens equally.  In conclusion, this Article examines the normative 
basis for excluding women that is thus exposed and offers some reasons 
why women, men, and the military itself should resist this normative ba-
sis for exclusion. 
II.  THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
Because the exclusion of women from combat is a sex-based gov-
ernment policy, the long-established jurisprudence of sex equality is a 
logical starting point for considering such a sex-based exclusion.  This 
Part first analyzes the law of sex equality and its applicability to the mili-
tary in the United States, concluding that a disconnect exists between 
what the law says it requires⎯justification for sex-based exclu-
sions⎯and what the law has done⎯leave the de jure exclusion largely 
unexamined.  Second, this Part considers legal treatment in other coun-
tries.  As a matter of politics or court-made law, more and more countries 
are abolishing the exclusion.  Just as in the United States, however, 
courts in other countries often rely on unstated assumptions rather than 
proof to uphold sex-based combat exclusions, and virtually all countries 
retain sex-based classifications in their military draft. 
A.  United States 
United States law is quite clear: governmental policies cannot diffe-
rentiate between men and women simply on the basis of normative be-
liefs of what men and women ought to do.  As the Supreme Court ex-
plained in United States v. Virginia, 
[T]he Court has repeatedly recognized that neither federal nor 
state government acts compatibly with the equal protection prin-
ciple when a law or official policy denies to women, simply be-
cause they are women, full citizenship stature— equal opportuni-
ty to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to society 
based on their individual talents and capacities.40 
The Court went on to explain that the law does recognize “physical dif-
ferences” between men and women, but that “inherent differences” can-
not be cause “for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial 
constraints on an individual’s opportunity.”41  Sex classifications, the 
Court said, “may not be used, as they once were . . . to create or perpe-
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 41. Id. at 533. 
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tuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.”42  In this 
vein, the Supreme Court has squarely and repeatedly rejected the ratio-
nale that women can be excluded from jobs based on beliefs about wom-
en’s separate sphere or role in society:43 “[G]eneralizations about ‘the 
way women are,’ estimates of what is appropriate for most women, no 
longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and capacity 
place them outside the average description.”44 
In the 1970s, some courts applied these principles when women 
challenged barriers to their military service.45  These challenges formed 
part of the dialog that led to the legislative reforms of the 1970s.46  As 
early as 1972, Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that invoking pregnancy to 
exclude women from the military was sex discrimination.47  A landmark 
case was Owens v. Brown.48  There, Judge Sirica for the District of Co-
lumbia District Court held that the statutory bar preventing women’s as-
signment to most Navy vessels, originally passed in 1948, violated equal 
protection.49  Applying the then-new intermediate scrutiny standard, the 
court agreed that the asserted objective of the law “to increase the com-
bat effectiveness of Navy ships” was “a governmental objective of the 
highest order.”50  However, there was no evidence that this objective was 
the actual intended purpose of the legislation.  To the contrary, the ban 
on women serving in Navy ships was added to the 1948 law “over the 
military’s objections and without significant deliberation.”51  In fact, the 
amendment’s congressional sponsor explained that he was offering it 
because he did not believe ships were a “proper place” for women.52  
Further, the court held, the Navy’s cited concerns about group dynamics, 
morale, and discipline⎯an argument virtually identical to that termed 
                                                 
 42. Id. at 534. 
 43. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729 (2003); Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532; 
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977). 
 44. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 550; see also Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496, 1503 (D. Kan. 
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 48. 455 F. Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding unconstitutional 10 U.S.C § 6015). 
 49. Id. at 294 & n.1. 
 50. Id. at 305. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 206 n.53. 
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“unit cohesion” today⎯were not borne out by evidence.53  And, at least 
as to the non-combat positions at issue in that case, the court held that 
studies showed women could do them.54  Rather than appeal, the gov-
ernment pursued an amendment to the law that was already in the works 
at the time of the decision.55 
After the 1970s, however, there were few recorded court challenges 
to the combat exclusion.56  One possible explanation for the lack of re-
cent cases is the deference that courts began to accord to Congress and 
the Executive in the military realm.57  The suggestion that all things mili-
tary are untouchable is questionable.  The cases limiting constitutional 
claims vastly expand a line of Supreme Court cases beginning with Feres 
v. United States, which involved statutory construction of the Federal 
Tort Claims Act.58  The Feres doctrine is often dubbed non-
justiciability,59 a dubious moniker given the doctrine’s origins in statuto-
ry construction.  The Court extended the doctrine to claims brought un-
der the cause of action created in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.60  The key case extending the doc-
trine was Chappell v. Wallace61 in which Justice Berger, writing for a 
unanimous Court, held that a Bivens remedy was unavailable to Navy-
enlisted men for racial discrimination: “We hold that enlisted military 
                                                 
 53. Id. at 309. 
 54. Id. 
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claim).  Citing similar concerns, courts of appeals have construed Title VII to have no application to 
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v. Dep’t of Army, 832 F.2d 247, 248 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Gonzalez v. Dep’t of the Army, 718 F.2d 
926 (9th Cir.1983); Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986 
(1978)). 
 58. 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950). 
 59. See, e.g., Wetherill v. Geren, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1139 (D.S.D. 2009) (dismissing consti-
tutional claims of sex and race discrimination by Army National Guard colonel as nonjusticiable 
despite claim that challenged conduct did not involve an assessment of plaintiff’s military qualifica-
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 60. 403 U.S. 388 (1971); see United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 676 (1987); Chappell v. 
Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983); Feres, 340 U.S. at 138. 
 61. 462 U.S. 296 (1983). 
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personnel may not maintain a suit to recover damages from a superior 
officer for alleged constitutional violations.”62  The Court remanded the 
case, leaving intact the claims for declaratory judgment and injunctive 
relief, as well as expressly reserving the question of whether the constitu-
tional conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) should stand.63  
Chappell relied on the Bivens “special factors” doctrine, which disallows 
the judicially created remedy where such factors are present, as well as 
the “peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors and 
the effects on the maintenance of such suits on discipline.”64 
Meanwhile, between Feres and Chappell, the Fifth Circuit decided 
the leading case of Mindes v. Seaman, holding that federal courts could 
sometimes adjudicate constitutional claims by uniformed service person-
nel challenging military decisions.65  Mindes, an Air Force officer, al-
leged due-process violations in an adverse performance report.66  The 
court dismissed the claim with minimal analysis, but articulated four fac-
tors to consider in such cases: (1) the nature and strength of the claim; (2) 
potential injury to the plaintiff; (3) interference with the military func-
tion; and (4) degree of military discretion involved.67 
In United States v. Stanley, the Supreme Court attempted to har-
monize the inconsistencies in the circuits’ applications of Chappell.68  
That case held that a service member had no cause of action to challenge 
the secret administration of LSD to him.69  Writing for a divided Court,70 
Justice Scalia indicated that the Feres “incident to service” test should 
guide the Bivens “special factors” determination in the military context.71  
Justice O’Connor had an interesting dissent on this point: although she 
agreed that Feres and Chappell both involved application of the “inci-
dent to service” test, she would have held the action alleged here to be 
                                                 
 62. Chappell, 462 U.S. 296 at 305. 
 63. Id. at 297, 305 & n.3. 
 64. Id. at 299 (citation and internal alterations omitted). 
 65. 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 201−02. 
 68. 483 U.S. 669, 676 (1987). 
 69. Id.  It overturned an Eleventh Circuit decision allowing the claim to proceed on Bivens 
grounds, distinguishing it from Chappell in part because some of the defendants were not Stanley’s 
superior officers.  Id. at 676, 680.  The Eleventh Circuit also remanded an FTCA claim to allow 
repleading.  Justice Scalia’s opinion expressed strong skepticism but did not reach the merits of this 
ruling, overturning it instead on procedural grounds in a portion of the opinion joined by all nine 
Justices.  Id. at 676−77. 
 70. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Blackmun, and Powell joined the majority in 
pertinent part.  Justices O’Connor, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented, although all of the 
dissenters did not embrace the same rationale. 
 71. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 680–82. 
2010] Exclusion of Women from Military Combat Positions 27 
“so far beyond the bounds of human decency that as a matter of law it 
simply cannot be considered a part of the military mission.”72 
Among the circuits, there are some areas of agreement that have ex-
tended the Feres doctrine still further.  It is generally agreed that any 
claim for money damages by a uniformed service member is barred if it 
is for harm incurred “incident to service,” unless there is an express sta-
tute authorizing military personnel to sue.73  For example, the Federal 
courts of appeals that considered the question have all held that the “in-
cident to service” test applies to § 1983 claims for damages brought 
against state officials by National Guard members.74  These decisions 
ignore the Supreme Court’s express reliance in Stanley and Chappell on 
the fact that it was limiting a judicially created right of action.75  The 
First Circuit’s reasoning is illustrative: “[T]here is no principled basis for 
according state actors sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a different degree of 
immunity than would be accorded federal actors sued for an identical 
abridgement of rights under Bivens.”76  Apparently lost on the lower 
courts are the Supreme Court’s pains to distinguish “the availability of a 
damages action under the Constitution for particular injuries (those in-
curred in the course of military service)” from “immunity to such an ac-
tion on the part of particular defendants.”77 
On the question of injunctive relief, however, the circuits remain 
divided.78  The Ninth Circuit still applies Mindes,79 while its circuit of 
origin, the Fifth (and the Eleventh), has abandoned it.80  Several courts 
apply the “incident to service” bar to claims for injunctive relief for spe-
cific personnel actions but allow facial challenges to military regula-
tions.81  Just prior to the Stanley decision, the D.C. Circuit held that 
                                                 
 72. Id. at 708–09 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justices Brennan and Marshall’s dissent noted 
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 74. See id. (collecting cases). 
 75. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 678; Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983). 
 76. Wright v. Park, 5 F.3d 586, 591 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 77. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 684. 
 78. See generally Speigner, 248 F.3d at 1296−98 (discussing split). 
 79. Wilkins v. United States, 279 F.3d 782, 788 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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claims for injunctive relief are allowed, following exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies, even for specific personnel actions: 
We have no quarrel with the district court’s conclusion that the op-
eration of the military is vested in Congress and the Executive, and 
that it is not for the courts to establish the composition of the armed 
forces.  But constitutional questions that arise out of military deci-
sions . . . are not committed to the other coordinate branches of 
government.  Where it is alleged, as it is here, that the armed forces 
have trenched upon constitutionally guaranteed rights through the 
promotion and selection process, the courts are not powerless to act.  
The military has not been exempted from constitutional provisions 
that protect the rights of individuals. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 
(1974).  It is precisely the role of the courts to determine whether 
those rights have been violated.  Dillard v. Brown, 652 F.2d 316, 
320 (3d Cir. 1981).82 
The military’s expertise deserves deference, but it is a disservice 
both to service members and to the military to suggest that military ser-
vice requires invidious discrimination.  As Judge Sirica stated in Owens 
v. Brown, deference to the military is correctly analyzed as a prudential 
consideration requiring courts to refrain from reviewing discretionary 
decisions that will involve the court  “in an inappropriate degree of su-
pervision over primary military activities,” not an absolute bar to justi-
ciability of any constitutional claim against the military.83 
While this court-made deference may explain why advocates no 
longer bring challenges on behalf of women, it has not similarly deterred 
Equal Protection challenges to military policies that are intended to bene-
fit women and service members of color.  Deference has been notably 
absent from cases alleging reverse discrimination in the military.  For 
example, a series of actions challenged the military’s late 1990s promo-
tion and retention instructions that included mandates to achieve diversi-
                                                 
 82. Emory v. Sec’y of Navy, 819 F.2d 291, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (reversing dis-
missal of black medical officer’s challenge to failure to promote him to the rank of Rear Admiral).  
On remand, the district court denied the claim on the merits.  Although the promotion board had no 
African-Americans, and indeed there were no black admirals in the medical corps, the plaintiff had 
not shown the requisite discriminatory purpose—he had failed to demonstrate that his record was 
“overwhelmingly superior” to that of white officers who were promoted, or to introduce evidence of 
racial disparities in the Navy generally.  Emory v. Sec’y of the Navy, 708 F. Supp. 1335, 1342 
(D.D.C. 1989).  This case appears to remain good law, even after Stanley.  See Emory v. Sec’y of 
Navy, No. 89-5196, 1989 WL 201552 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 29, 1989) (per curiam) (summarily affirming 
district court decision on the merits of the claim); Veitch v. England, No. CIV.A. 00-2982, 2005 WL 
762099 (D.D.C. Apr. 04, 2005) (distinguishing Emory on the facts). 
 83. Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291, 300 (D.D.C. 1978).  The cases limiting Title VII liabil-
ity are also problematic in light of the statutory text, which expressly applies to “employees or appli-
cants for employment . . . in military departments.”  42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(a).  For an earlier argument 
favoring Title VII liability, see Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. 1228 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). 
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ty and account for the effects of discrimination in evaluating perfor-
mance.84  The courts struck down not only numerical goals in promotion 
and retention, but also simple directives to consider the potential effects 
that discrimination may have had in determining the relative qualifica-
tions of women and service members of color.85 
These reverse discrimination holdings were not impeded by the 
supposed broad deference to military judgment.  For example, in Berkley 
v. United States, the Federal Circuit brushed the Feres argument aside, 
stating that deference to the military “does not prevent or preclude our 
review of [the policy] in this case in light of constitutional equal protec-
tion claims raised.”86  The deference cannot, of course, be one way.  A 
better rule was articulated by the D.C. Circuit: “The military has not been 
exempted from constitutional provisions that protect the rights of indi-
viduals.”87 
Under virtually any level of deference, the continued de jure com-
bat exclusion is particularly puzzling in light of the Supreme Court’s 
stringent anti-classification jurisprudence, recently reaffirmed in Ricci v. 
DeStefano.88  The Supreme Court again emphasized an “employee’s legi-
timate expectation not to be judged on the basis of” a protected characte-
ristic—in that case, race.89  So strong is this principle, the Court held, 
that an employer cannot deviate from it absent an almost bulletproof 
showing that it needed to take race into account to correct a violation of 
the law.90  In other words, Ricci continued the Supreme Court’s familiar 
line of cases that held that, even if not intended to harm, any classifica-
tion on the basis of race is de jure discrimination⎯which is almost al-
ways illegal.91  Although sex-based classification is subject to a different 
                                                 
 84. See, e.g., Berkley v. United States, 287 F.3d 1076 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Saunders v. White, 191 
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 88. 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2677 (2009). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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level of scrutiny, the government still has a clear constitutional mandate 
to justify any classification that the government makes on the basis of 
sex.92  Sex, like race, is a suspect classification that cannot be invoked 
without some showing of a basis in reality for the distinction.93  In light 
of the Supreme Court’s guidance that normative beliefs about women’s 
role in society are insufficient justification for such classifications, the 
combat-exclusion rules warrant further examination. 
B.  International Cases 
Internationally, a few courts have struck down sex-based barriers to 
women’s military service based on equality law.  A 1989 decision of the 
Canadian Human Rights Tribunal removed gender-based employment 
barriers and directed complete integration of women into combat roles 
“with all due speed.”94  A decade later the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Communities (ECJ) ruled that Germany’s restrictive combat-
exclusion law⎯limiting women to “medical and military-music servic-
es”⎯was too sweeping and thus violated European Council Directive 
7/207/EEC, which mandates equal access to employment.95  The court’s 
language emphasized proportionality and indicated that a less restrictive 
law might pass muster,96 but Germany reportedly responded by opening 
all positions, including combat, to women.97 
As the limited scope of the German case suggests, international ju-
risprudence, like U.S. case law, more commonly accepts sex-based mili-
tary classifications without much justification. A number of countries 
have changed their law under political instead of judicial impetus, but 
                                                 
 92. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–34 (1996). 
 93. Id. at 533. 
 94. Brown v. Canadian Armed Forces, T.D. 3/89 (Canadian H.R. Trib., Feb. 20, 1989), 
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particular nature of the posts in question . . . .”). 
 97. Ulrike Liebert, Europeanization and the “Needle’s Eye”: The Transformation of Employ-
ment Policy in Germany, 3 REV. POL’Y RESEARCH 479 (2003); Peter Finn, German Women Gain 
Job Parity in Military, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2001, at A12. 
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others defend their sex-based combat exclusions.98  Virtually all coun-
tries that have compulsory military service have a male-only draft.99 
Often erroneously believed to afford full equality in combat to 
women, Israel followed a similar course to the United States in banning 
women from combat positions until the 1990s.  In the 1948 Israeli war of 
independence, women served on the front lines in small numbers.100  In 
addition to filling support roles, women made up about 20% of the Pal-
mach, the most active force.101  These policies changed, however, in the 
Defense Service Law, first passed in 1949, which excluded women from 
such roles.102 
Israel is unusual in that it has a draft that covers women, but wom-
en’s mandatory service differs from men’s in several respects, including 
a shorter length and more available exemptions.103  In 1995, the Israeli 
Supreme Court issued a decision that was a mirror image of Rostker.  It 
held that the military could not use the difference in mandatory service to 
exclude women who volunteered for longer service from combat posi-
tions, but did not question the difference in the draft.104  Following this 
decision, the law was amended, somewhat equivocally, to provide wom-
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 103. Id. at 537−38. 
 104. Id. at 543–46 (discussing HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Def. [1995] IsrSC 49(4)). 
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en an “equal right to that of a man to serve in any duty,” except “if de-
manded by the nature or character of the position.”105 
Some courts do not even go as far as the limited holdings of the 
ECJ in the German case and the Israeli court.  The ECJ upheld Switzer-
land and Germany’s all-male draft laws in 2003,106 and upheld the United 
Kingdom’s ban on women in the Royal Marines in 1999.107  Emphasiz-
ing proportionality, the court agreed with the United Kingdom that even 
a female cook could be excluded because the Royal Marines, unlike oth-
er branches of the service, are the “point of the arrow head” and thus, all 
Marines may be “required to serve as front-line commandos.”108  The 
court did not explain, much less cite any factual findings supporting, the 
basis for its conclusion that women could not be front-line comman-
dos.109  The United Kingdom has thus far not removed the remaining re-
strictions.110  An official commission designated to study the question 
military-wide concluded inter alia that only an “elite few” women could 
pass the physical-strength tests required for infantry and Royal Ar-
moured Corps, or tank regiment, positions.111 
The upshot of jurisprudence both in the United States and interna-
tionally is that courts often fail to apply equality mandates to women in 
combat, with little analysis or justification.  Because perceived innate 
differences, usually physical strength, seem to be the implicit, unexa-
mined justification that courts use to uphold the combat exclusion, I turn 
now to the physical-strength argument. 
III.  FOUR PROBLEMS WITH PHYSICAL-STRENGTH RATIONALES 
This Part discusses four problems with physical-strength rationales: 
stereotyping, differential training, trait selection, and task definition.  
Analysis of each of these rationales reveals a different argument against 
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allowing perceived differences in physical strength to justify de jure ex-
clusion of women from the military.  Furthermore, each rationale expos-
es a deeper level of discrimination that is built into the strength argu-
ment. 
A.  Stereotyping 
The first, and fairly obvious, question about the physical-strength 
justification for de jure exclusions of women is why women who could 
pass the physical tests are not allowed to serve, while men who could not 
pass the physical tests are allowed to serve.  Individual evaluation is the 
popular legal response to de jure discrimination.112  An individual ap-
proach holds both attractions and pitfalls,113 but it highlights an important 
aspect of the physical-strength claim. 
Few people seriously claim that the differences are so vast and the 
standards so exacting that no woman can meet them.  Even the most ar-
dent opponent to integration must admit there are some women who can 
outperform the vast majority of men.114  A mainstay of the argument 
against women’s service, however, is that such women are rare.  The ar-
gument stresses averages: the “average woman” has less aerobic capaci-
ty, muscle mass, etc.115  For example, one group, dissenting from a go-
vernmental commission set up in the early 1990s to study expanding 
women’s roles in the military, argued, “In terms of physical capability, 
the upper five percent of women are at the level of the male median.”116  
Of course, the first problem with this claim is that the “average woman,” 
like the “average man,” may not be joining the military.  To his credit, 
Brian Mitchell, author of one of the better-researched physical-strength 
arguments against women’s military service, discusses instead the physi-
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cal attributes of the “average female Army recruit.”117  Here again, how-
ever, an argument about averages cannot explain why the women who 
are above average are excluded, or for that matter, why men who are be-
low average are not. 
Mitchell attempts to show that very few women would qualify for 
the positions from which they are currently excluded.  Mitchell’s asser-
tion that “men have enormous advantages physically”118 might at first 
appear to have some support.  He cites Army studies that find women 
entering the service have about 55% of the upper body strength of men.  
Additionally, he reports the results from a 1978–1983 Navy study of 
damage control tasks⎯the emergency response work, such as firefight-
ing, that all crewmembers participate in during battle and other shipboard 
emergencies.119  The study was designed to validate a strength-test bat-
tery.  It examined two sets of tasks: general shipboard tasks, including 
damage control; and rating-specific tasks.  It set time limits on perform-
ing the tasks and attempted to identify strength tests that would exclude 
the same percentage of the test group as had failed at the actual task.  For 
the general shipboard tasks, the sample consisted of twenty-four men and 
twenty-one women assigned to a shore intermediate maintenance facility; 
for the rating-specific tasks, the sample was a much larger group of 
around 200 men and 200 women recruits in the second half of their basic 
training.120 
The most dramatic differences involved carrying large, heavy ob-
jects.  For example, in a two-person carry of a loaded (approximately 190 
pounds) stretcher up and down an inclined ladder, 81% of the women 
and 4% of the men failed to complete the task on time.  Likewise, in a 
two-person carry of a 147-pound P250 fire pump (a large, gasoline-
powered engine in a cubical frame) down ladders quickly, 90% of the 
women and 36% of the men failed to finish on time.  About one-quarter 
of the women, and few or no men, failed five tasks involving moving 
through doors and scuttles.121  The larger, rating-specific study confirmed 
that selecting the most muscularly demanding tasks from the most de-
manding Navy ratings, and translating the requirements to an arm-
strength test, “excluded most or all women but few men.”122 
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Even if this study shows some differences in men’s and women’s 
abilities to accomplish particular tasks, it does not explain a decision to 
use de jure exclusions for women alone rather than individual evalua-
tions for the exclusion of both men and women.123  Both women and men 
qualified, and both men and women failed to qualify in most tests⎯what 
purpose is served in excluding all and only women?  For example, in the 
P250 carry, 90% of the women failed, but 10% passed.  Moreover, 36% 
of the men failed.  Certain physical tests, such as an arm pull, were rela-
tively well-correlated to the ability to do static muscularly demanding 
tasks.124  The military has the advantage of a basic-training period in 
which to evaluate potential recruits; it could administer tests like those 
validated in this study and avoid de jure discrimination. 
A common response to the stereotyping analysis is cost—that eve-
rything from equipment to medical attention is more expensive when 
women are integrated into a service that ought to be all male.  The cost 
argument is addressed in more detail below.125  For now, the cost rebuttal 
to the stereotyping analysis tells us something about the contours of the 
strength argument.  The claim must be that the differences are large 
enough that it is possible to measure strength traits with a single cutoff 
that will include most men and exclude almost all women.  The claim 
must further be that this cutoff exactly corresponds with the military’s 
needs.  As a “statutory scheme which draws a sharp line between the 
sexes,” this argument seems suspicious.  Drawing such a line “solely for 
the purpose of achieving administrative convenience,” is arguably a pur-
pose “forbidden by the Constitution.”126 
Ultimately, the stereotyping argument⎯that women should be in-
cluded and excluded based on individual performance, not an assumption 
that women generally cannot adequately perform⎯cannot support the 
argument against integration.  Critics have to fall back on a normative 
argument.  Thus, Mitchell and others invoke the military “soul” as the 
true “cost” of integrating women, explicitly championing masculinity 
norms of protection of the feminine.127  The stereotyping analysis, then, 
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has removed the centrality of the strength rationale and flushed out social 
norms as the key to de jure exclusion. 
B.  Differential Training 
The stereotyping analysis is limited in the same ways that the phys-
ical-strength argument is limited: It assumes that observed differences in 
studies indicate natural differences in men’s and women’s ability to do a 
job.128  This assumption is the second difficulty with the physical-
strength claims: They leap to the conclusion that the observed differences 
in physical strength must be entirely inherent.129  Such a conclusion is 
not supported by research; to the contrary, a substantial body of research 
shows that women are systematically discouraged from physical activi-
ties and sports from the day they are born.130  Therefore, it is not surpris-
ing if women show less physical prowess when they arrive at the military 
as young adults. 
Differences in physical training are profound and go well beyond a 
few hours on a sports field or at a gym.131  Women’s approach to physi-
cal tasks hobbles them; they do not use the full potential of their bo-
dies.132  Women are taught to occupy less space and avoid getting hurt.133  
Women take themselves to be the object, rather than the originator, of 
movement.134  In other words, discrimination is built into our bodies.135 
Reversing a lifetime of training is no small task, but there is evi-
dence that training women intensively can close the gap.  A four-month, 
three-times-a-week training program for female civilian firefighting can-
didates produced 25% of approximately thirty-six participants in the pro-
gram who passed a physical test to compete for the job as New York City 
firefighters.136  This result was still worse than men’s 57% passage rate, 
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but substantially better than the overall women’s passage rate of 9.5% for 
the 105 women who took the test.137  Likewise, women’s running times 
in Olympic marathons decreased steadily in the eight years after the 
event was introduced for women, and much more rapidly than men’s, a 
phenomenon plausibly attributed to increased opportunities for women to 
train.138 
The results of the Navy study also suggest that the cause of the ob-
served differences in strength is differential training, rather than innate 
differences, in three ways.  First, the study apparently did not control for 
differences in sea-duty experience.  In the early 1980s, the men assigned 
to a shore intermediate maintenance facility probably would have much 
more experience serving on ships than the women because of the limited 
availability of sea billets to women.139  This disparity in experience 
would be particularly significant for the tasks involving moving through 
doors and scuttles, since these are routine movements for personnel as-
signed to ships but unfamiliar to others.140 
Second, the results suggest that it is not sheer muscle mass that is 
inhibiting women.  For example, on several tests the cutoff score for the 
strength-test battery had to be set higher for women than for men in order 
to exclude the same proportion of the group that failed the shipboard task 
that the test was designed to measure the ability to do.141  In other words, 
women needed to be stronger to perform at the same level as men.  This 
finding supports the conclusion that women are not trained to use their 
bodies in ways that are as efficient as men.  Thus, differences in what 
women can do may be based on how the women are using their bodies, 
which can change, rather than immutable physical differences. 
Finally, the age of the study is a concern given significant increases 
in women’s physical training in the 1980s and 1990s, pursuant to chang-
ing norms particularly among United States and European women.142  
Thus, this study cannot be taken as evidence that women cannot ever do 
the job. 
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Some advocates of the physical-strength argument do address the 
argument that differential training, which can be overcome, is responsi-
ble for the differences.  Mitchell remarks on dramatic differences be-
tween male and female West Point attendees after “eight weeks of inten-
sive training,” with men demonstrating 270% more power and 473% 
more work than women at the bench press.143  In a footnote, we learn that 
the study was conducted in 1976, and that strength and power were not 
emphasized in the training.144   More recent and relevant studies indi-
cate that training may make a substantial difference in women’s physical 
performance.  A 2000 study found that female Army trainees made sub-
stantially larger improvements in physical fitness than men in the course 
of an eight-week basic training, although both men and women im-
proved.  Women’s average numbers went from 70% to 97% of men’s for 
sit-ups, from 33% to 56% of men’s for push-ups, and, for running, wom-
en’s times went from 133% to 121% of men’s.145  The study suggests 
that basic training is capable of addressing some of the difference be-
tween men and women.  While critics often charge that basic training has 
“gone soft,” because physical standards were lowered across the board 
(for men and women) when women were integrated,146 this study sup-
ports a different story (and one consistent with my personal experience): 
Basic training is rigorous and individualized enough that it will push 
those who enter less fit, including women, to narrow the gap.147 
Another reason for disparities in strength is that women in the mili-
tary are still subject to powerful social norms that dictate that they limit 
their physical capabilities. Tellingly, Mitchell notes that when a Navy 
ship was outfitted with strength-training equipment and women were 
encouraged to train, they did not, because physical fitness was “anathe-
ma” to them.148  For him, women failed to train because they are natural-
ly feminine, which is to say averse to physical exercise. 
Yet it seems more likely that frequent charges by critics, such as 
Mitchell, that women in the military are lesbians,149 combined with high-
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er numbers of discharges of women for homosexuality,150 require women 
in the military constantly to affirm their (heterosexual) femininity by 
making their bodies physically weak.151 
Thus, differential training and socialization account for at least a 
part of the observed differences.  The failure of critics to take these fac-
tors into account signals a bias toward naturalizing difference.  Critics 
ignore increases in women’s observed physical strength when their train-
ing is changed.  For example, both improvements in women’s physical-
fitness standards changed since the 1980s and specialized training have 
been shown to increase women’s physical strength.152  These failures 
signal an underlying bias⎯a desire to believe that the differences be-
tween men and women are natural and immutable.  That bias has pre-
vented exploring the empirical evidence of how best to find qualified 
personnel for the military. 
C.  Trait Selection 
Thus far, I have only addressed the question of whether women 
might perform better than critics would suggest, based on the critics’ 
own scales, that is, that women might be able to do more push-ups or 
carry heavier objects.  Critics of complete integration generally argue 
that if women cannot measure up in an evaluation of these tasks, they 
will be less able to do certain military jobs, such as infantry.153  However, 
there is a step missing in that analysis.  How do we know that push-ups 
are beneficial to the foot soldier?  Test validation154 never enters into the 
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argument, presumably because critics rely on the association of the mili-
tary with masculinity to fill the gap.155  Women’s lower scores are taken 
as evidence that women are weaker rather than as evidence that the tests 
are an inadequate measure of physical ability.156 
Critics often invoke women’s lower scores on the general physical-
fitness tests as proof of women’s lower ability to perform in particular 
military positions.  The military disagrees; it does not hold the general 
physical-fitness requirements to map onto job-specific requirements.157 
In fact, the military has different requirements based on age group and 
sex.  For example, as of 2000, in the Navy’s general Physical Readiness 
Test, men over 50 needed to complete 42% fewer curl-ups and had 12% 
more time to complete a 1.5 mile run than women 17−19 years old; the 
push-up requirements were the same.158  Standards were set similarly for 
the Army and Marine Corps fitness assessments.159  Older men are likely 
to be less physically capable by these measures than the women the crit-
ics claim are an intolerable liability, yet the critics do not argue that the 
test results should be used to exclude those men. 
At least one physical-strength argument advocate claims, in an un-
supported and underdeveloped line of reasoning, that changing the tasks 
and the requirement tests to include women reduces the military’s tough 
image and, therefore, its effectiveness.  Mitchell argues that allowing the 
physical-fitness requirement to vary contradicts a “worldwide consen-
sus” that soldiers must be “tougher, faster, stronger, and more physically 
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able than the rest of the populace.”160  With nothing more to justify it 
than a “consensus,” Mitchell’s argument apparently reverts to a norma-
tive claim.  This may instead be a third-party claim—a claim that mili-
tary members must look tough or masculine to our potential enemies.  
Although the third-party claim has some force, it is unclear that it would 
outweigh the need for personnel qualified to perform the actual job func-
tions.  In the employment context, if third-party preferences are used to 
justify discrimination, courts have required that they must be for some-
thing that is central, not peripheral, to the business.161  At the very least, 
speculation is insufficient. 
Outsiders’ perceptions aside, the Navy study mentioned above162 
might seem to come closest to measuring ability to do the job, but that is 
deceptive: That study and others show that physical ability is a complex 
phenomenon and that men and women may have very divergent scores 
on some tests, but substantially overlap on others.  There is not a uniform 
distance across men’s and women’s scores, so the scores do not justify a 
static line drawn precisely where it will include most men and exclude 
most women.  For example, women were significantly closer to men in a 
task that involved carrying the P250 fire pump both up and down ladders 
in a longer time frame; 38% of women and 14% of men failed.163  Simi-
larly, the larger rating-specific study analyzes the difference in women’s 
and men’s scores and finds statistical overlaps vary enormously.164  For 
example, the overlap between men’s and women’s scores was 90% in a 
task that simulated carrying molten metal between 99 and 168 pounds 
and moving sideways and pouring it into molds; it was 7% in a task that 
simulated pulling an airplane tow bar, bearing about 62 pounds of 
weight, for 300 feet.165 
The studies suggest several areas where women’s ability is more 
closely matched to men’s.  Not unexpectedly, body weight, one of the 
physical measures, was directly correlated with static lifting tasks but 
inversely correlated with rigorous movement requirements.166  This find-
ing suggests that women, statistically lighter, would have the advantage 
in dynamic military tasks.  Thus, the study raises questions about which 
traits are being selected as measures of physical ability. 
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Similarly, the 2000 study did not find differences to be uniform 
across strength measures.  After completing basic training, women’s 
mean run time and push-up numbers did fall more than a standard devia-
tion below the men’s means, but their sit-up numbers were virtually iden-
tical.167  Moreover, other studies find that women and men are much 
more closely matched in leg strength than in arm strength.168 
It is important to keep in mind what question is being answered.  A 
study may have valid measures of the ability to do a particular task, yet 
not provide an accurate measure of the ability to do the whole job⎯the 
study measures only the parts of the job that men tend do better, and not 
the parts of the job that women tend to do better.169  As discussed above, 
critics cite studies of whether women are capable of isolated tasks identi-
fied as muscularly demanding.170  These studies do not tell us whether 
women can do the job of a sailor assigned to a Navy ship.  For example, 
the Navy study researchers explicitly studied precisely those tasks per-
ceived to be the most difficult for women, because that is what Congress 
asked them to do.171  As Jeanine Altmann has pointed out in the context 
of primate studies, understanding what is involved in the life and work of 
a particular group requires a representative sample of what all group 
members do over time, not isolated study of subjectively identified 
events.172  By no means do all men in a ship’s crew ever carry a P250 fire 
pump. 
Indeed, real life examples show that, despite the lower scores on 
isolated tasks, women performed well in the jobs for which those same 
studies were meant to apply.  For example, in actual damage control situ-
ations, no one has reported any problems with women’s performance.  
The Presidential Commission appointed by President George H.W. Bush 
found that “200 women performed well in an actual firefighting emer-
gency aboard a Navy ship in 1988.”173  The difference between the theo-
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retical expectation that women are unable to perform the job (because 
some women were unable to perform some tasks) and actual results in a 
real life emergency can probably be explained by the fact that women 
possess many unmeasured abilities.  For instance, isolated studies do not 
measure the critical endurance that is required for crews to fight fires for 
days on end. 
Women have a number of advantages that are useful in the military 
context.174  It is important to realize that  generalizations about these ad-
vantages, even when intended to benefit women, run the risk of accept-
ing differences as natural⎯an acceptance, that, as we have seen, is nei-
ther empirically supported nor ultimately empowering to women.  Stu-
dies can only measure women’s bodies as they come to be in conditions 
of today’s imperfectly equal society.175  With this in mind, we can still 
note findings suggesting that women today have physical characteristics 
that warrant just as much study as potentially important to various mili-
tary tasks.  Survey respondents in the Navy study reported that restricted 
space made twenty of fifty tasks very difficult,176 suggesting that a small-
er stature may actually be an advantage.  Mitchell admits that women are 
less susceptible to altitude sickness and cold.177  Women have a higher 
speed-to-body-size ratio in sprint events, suggesting that they pack power 
more efficiently.178 Women’s greater body fat contributes to streamlining 
and cold resistance, both of which are advantages in swimming.179 
Endurance is another area in which women may have an advantage.  
Several studies have found that, in submaximal performance, women’s 
muscles have significantly slower fatigue and faster recovery than men’s 
do.180  A 1999 study concluded this result is likely due to  different mus-
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cle composition.181  Women also have higher percentages of intramuscu-
lar fat and may burn it more efficiently, possibly contributing to their 
endurance for submaximal (less than the maximum of which an individ-
ual is capable) work.182  Other military forces have taken advantage of 
women’s greater capacity for endurance.183  For instance, the Vietnamese 
military put women’s greater endurance to practical use when it assigned 
women to carry supplies because they had greater stamina and com-
plained less of the drudgery.184  They earned the description of “water 
buffalo of the Revolution.”185 
Physical ability is substantially more complex than a single unified 
“strength” trait.  If physical abilities are to justify selections for job per-
formance, one cannot pick and choose which abilities to measure by sex, 
not job, correlation.186  By failing to justify trait selection that advantages 
men as job-related, critics reveal that they are defining “strength” around 
men’s abilities.  They thus attribute large observed differences on selec-
tive measures to a natural “physical strength.” However, it is the strategic 
selection of the measures, not the job requirements, that leads to the dra-
matic gap. 
D.  Task Definition 
Finally, to the extent that military tasks remain better suited for 
men’s bodies, it is by no means apparent that this is the only, or even the 
best, way to design military equipment and procedures.  Both the meas-
ures and the tasks are designed to fit men.  Critics often respond to sug-
gestions that tasks and equipment be modified by claiming that inserting 
women into a man’s world is an unnecessary expense taken only to fur-
ther social engineering instead of military readiness.  This argument ig-
nores the constant redesign needed to maintain the United States mili-
tary’s technological advantage. For example, Mitchell discusses the 
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“problems” posed by women’s “smaller size and different shape” (the 
unstated comparison being to men and military members, a single con-
flated category)—the need to design “special” equipment and clothing.187  
Obviously, as the Mad Hatter would point out,188 we might just as well 
say that men’s larger size and different shape creates the need for special 
equipment and clothing.189  Mitchell’s appeal, though, is for the ease of 
maintaining the status quo, and he uses the high cost of modifications to 
support his argument that it is simply too costly to integrate women into 
the military.  The chief difficulty with this cost argument is that the mili-
tary is, and must be, constantly in the process of upgrading its equip-
ment.  Technological advancement is one of the major ways that the 
United States remains a world military leader.190  For example, the P250 
fire pump used in the Navy study has since been redesigned to run on jet 
fuel instead of gasoline, to eliminate the need to store highly flammable 
gasoline on ships; the new model is also smaller.191  As Martha Minow 
has noted, redesigning the status quo for those who have been left out 
can result in advantages for everyone.192  “[L]ighter firefighters’ hel-
mets”193 would probably benefit not only women but also men who must 
wear them for long hours during disasters in Navy ships. 
Mitchell raises a more serious problem, involving anthropometric 
standards,194 but again the argument advances the male norm rather than 
real constraints.  Anthropometrics is the concern that some equipment, 
for example jet-fighter cockpits, needs to be designed for a particular size 
person.  A mixed-gender military means that there will be a greater range 
of sizes to consider.195  First, anthropometrics are complex, and vary by 
race as well as sex.196  Some equipment may be available to a smaller 
percentage of military members regardless of whether there are women 
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in the military.197  Second, the argument does not consider that, if partic-
ular roles are to be limited by anthropometrics, they should be limited by 
those with physical characteristics best suited to the job—who may not 
always be men.  For example, Mitchell concedes that women suffer less 
from altitude sickness, but does not consider whether it would be more 
efficient to design cockpits for their average measurements.198  Once 
again, the argument favors ideology over reality. 
Another cost-increase physical-strength argument advocates use to 
counter the concept of task redefinition is the need for more crew to do 
the same job.  Mitchell does discuss one attempt to redefine tasks, at a 
fire station in Adak, Alaska, with a crew of three-quarters women.199  He 
claims that despite “special, lighter” equipment and the procedures re-
written for women’s physiques, “the department was forced to assign 
five women to engine companies that normally required only four 
men.”200  The argument is that task redefinition in the context of strength 
requirements will simply come down to needing more personnel. 
Even if redefinition of some tasks includes adding more personnel, 
de jure exclusion of women is an excessive response.  It may be that 
some tasks require unusually strong people, more likely to be men than 
women in the world today, even given some professional training.  In 
order to justify broad exclusions, not just rating-specific tests, it would 
also need to be the case that it is difficult to extricate those tasks from 
general duties.  Assuming this difficulty to be true still does not justify a 
de jure exclusion of women who have the strength, as noted above, with-
out a supplemental normative argument.  It does force a choice, though.  
Physical-strength standards could be set very high for broad segments of 
the military, so that every member of a ship’s crew, for example, is able 
to wrestle fire pumps up and down ladders without help. 
But the military has never chosen to exclude such broad swaths of 
qualified personnel.  The military evidently does not turn away the men 
who do not meet the physical requirements that the critics advocate, be-
cause men as well as women failed each one of the tests in the studies 
discussed above.201  It is more likely to be cost effective to use a second 
alternative, based on a less partial view of the job: Select the best people 
for the other 99% of the job description.  The need for the rare instance 
in which an extra body is required to accomplish a difficult task is a very 
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small part of the overall picture.  The steadily increasing participation of 
women in the military202 suggests that this is precisely the military’s 
judgment. 
Task definition is the clearest indicator that all of the thinking be-
hind physical-strength arguments assumes that a male military member is 
normal and a female military member must be accommodated with “spe-
cial” clothing, equipment, and procedures.  This section has aimed to 
show that standards for job performance can remain high despite task 
redefinition.  The failure to explore this possibility indicates that a nor-
mative belief, rather than an inexorable reality, is driving the physical-
strength rationale for de jure exclusion of women from the military. 
IV.  THE NORMATIVE BASIS FOR DE JURE EXCLUSION 
A pattern emerges from these four problems.  What appears to be a 
biological truth is actually better understood as a normative belief that 
the military’s job is in some way peculiarly suited to men.  It is not that 
women’s bodies do not measure up against an objective standard, but 
that the standard is defined so women do not fit it.  This Part examines 
the normative claims exposed as underlying the physical-strength argu-
ments. 
In pre-Rostker cases, rejecting men’s equal protection challenges to 
the draft, courts made the underlying normative rationale quite clear: “If 
a nation is to survive, men must provide the first line of defense while 
women keep the home fires burning.”203  Subsequent cases cite this poli-
cy as justification for otherwise unsupported claims about “obvious” in-
nate differences in physical strength, rather than providing factual sup-
port for actual differences as a justification for the policy.204 
In contrast, a Montana district court actually examined the physical-
strength evidence and rejected the “actual differences” defense.  The 
judge found: “There is simply no basis for concluding that all or even a 
significant number of women are incapable of serving in the military.  
This statement is true even assuming they would be placed in combat 
roles.”205  As a society, we still seem to accept the belief that it is the re-
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ality of women’s bodies that limits their participation in the military.  As 
we have seen, however, that belief is deeply flawed—for example, con-
sider again the simple stereotyping analysis that asks why women would 
be excluded de jure.  The exclusion instead relies on an understanding 
that the kinds of things the military does are, and should be, appropriate-
ly within the male realm.  But in incorrectly presupposing that men are, 
literally, strong, and women are, literally, weak, competence is confused 
with masculinity, and incompetence is confused with femininity.  This 
presupposition has an important corollary: masculinity becomes a mark 
of power and status—even in all-male settings.206 
It goes beyond stereotyping, however, because in believing men are 
stronger, we both train them to be stronger, and we create a military de-
signed around their abilities—in other words, we make the belief real.  
Epistemologist Sally Haslanger has termed this cognitive mechanism 
“assumed objectivity.”207  Members of a powerful group ascribe charac-
teristics to a weak group in a way that makes the differences real, and in 
a vicious cycle, the ascribed characteristics help make the weak group 
weak.208  For example, slave owners might ascribe a lack of intelligence 
to slaves, claim that this characteristic is innate, use this professed belief 
to justify a lack of education, and in this way make real a difference that 
keeps the slave owners in power.209 
It works the same way for sex.210  First, observed regularities—
women’s lower scores on physical-strength tests—are taken to be a con-
sequence of women’s weak nature. Second, women’s weak nature is ar-
gued to constrain decisions around their inclusion in certain military 
jobs.  Haslanger argues that, while there is not necessarily anything 
wrong with conforming action to the nature of things, in the context of 
gender, such constraints reinforce a distorted view of reality.211  This 
view leads to the third, critical step of assumed objectivity, contributing 
“the element of illusion—the masking of social/moral facts as natural 
facts.”212  The starting position that purports to be neutral in fact presup-
poses the masculinity of the military. 213 
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This distortion is counterproductive for women and for men.  
Women lose by being defined as incompetent to serve in combat roles 
just because they are women.  The military is a central institution of na-
tional and international power.  It has a vital role in the international rule 
of law.  The physical-strength argument reveals an underlying normative 
distinction between combatant and noncombatant that is gendered and 
hierarchical.  Women must shatter this distinction or risk permanent sub-
ordination.  If women want to invoke state protection from violence, as 
we should, the institution that provides that protection cannot legally de-
fine women as unequal. 
If the arguments to exclude women from the military are less than 
empowering to women, they are less than flattering to men: “Our ulti-
mate marching orders,” writes Stephanie Gutmann, “come from the im-
perative to extend our species, and on some very primitive level we ‘un-
derstand’ that eggs are expensive and sperm—that is men’s bodies, 
which throughout history have been treated like so much matchwood—
are cheap.”214  Gutmann’s willingness to characterize military men, who 
are disproportionately rural and black,215 as disposable and oversexed is 
particularly surprising given her explicit recognition of the class attitudes 
that lead political liberals to look down on the military.216 
Men lose by being constrained to the role of oversexed aggressors, 
on pain of losing their identity as men.217  As bell hooks puts it: “Men are 
not exploited or oppressed by sexism, but there are ways in which they 
suffer as a result of it.”218  The United Nations Secretary General found 
that “[t]here is . . . significant diversity among men, shaped by local con-
text and cultures.”219  Even among men, diversity of ability is an impor-
tant aspect of military teams,220 yet it is threatened when a single set of 
characteristics conforming to beliefs about masculinity are confused with 
military ability. 
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The question becomes not whether equality should be accommo-
dated at the expense of military readiness, but how much military readi-
ness can be sacrificed to adhere to inaccurate views about women’s and 
men’s ability. 221  Analyzing the physical-strength rationale for de jure 
exclusion of women from combat exposes the distorted lens demanding 
that men be strong and women be weak.  This distorted lens compromis-
es the military mission on many levels.  It leads to excluding available 
personnel who not only would be capable of doing the job, but also 
might do it better. 
More profoundly, the mission of the military is to protect and de-
fend our democratic society.  This mission is compromised if it is 
achieved through subordination of a segment of that democratic socie-
ty.222  To echo President Obama, it is time to repeal another law and reg-
ulation “that denies . . . Americans the right to serve the country they 
love because of who they are”:223 The prohibition on women serving in 
combat. 
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